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Abstract - This paper discusses the concept of cyber defence 
exercises (CDX) that are very important tool when it comes to 
enhancing the safety awareness of cyberspace, testing an 
organization’s ability to put up resistance and respond to 
different cyber events to establish the secure environment, 
gathering empirical data related to security, and looking at the 
practical training of experts on this subject. The exercises can 
give ideas to the decision makers about the precautions in the 
cybersecurity area and to the officials, institutions, organizations, 
and staff who are responsible on the cyber tools, techniques, and 
procedures that can be developed for this field. In the cyber 
defense exercises, the scenarios that are simulated closest to 
reality which provides very important contributions by bringing 
together the necessity of making the best decisions and 
management capabilities under the cyber crisis by handling 
stress and coordinated movement as a team. The objective of this 
paper is to address the issue from a scientific point of view by 
setting out the stages of planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of these exercises, taking into account and comparing 
international firefighting exercises. Another aim of the work is to 
be able to reveal the necessary processes that are required for all 
kind of cyber exercises, regardless of the type, although the 
processes involved vary according to the target mass of the 
planned exercise. 
Index Terms— Cyber defense, security exercises, cyber 
resilience, cyber threat, cyber security, cyber-attack mitigation, 
cyber crisis management. 
I. RELATED WORK 
CDX have been identified as an efficient mechanism to 
practice IT security awareness training [1, 2] but are also an 
ultimate tool to reveal and define the different security needs of 
every organization [3]. It provides an excellent opportunity and 
ultimate learning experience [4, 5] for the students to improve 
their skills in protecting and defending information systems are 
assessed in the context of realistic, true-to-life scenario [6]. On 
the other side, as discussed by Vigna [7] and Mink [8], the 
offensive security training is also an effective way to learn 
information security. The previous works in this area examined 
the structure [9] and how to use of cyber defence competitions, 
overall effectiveness of live-attack exercises in teaching 
information security [10], curriculum and course format at 
CDX in which teams design, implement, manage and defend a 
network of computers [11-15]. Other literature has examined 
the benefit of conducting cyber defense competitions at the K-
12 level [16, 17]. The architecture of a cyber defense 
competition [18] and different tools and techniques used and 
how they fit into an active learning approach and how it 
focuses on the operational aspect of managing and protecting 
an existing network infrastructure were described by Green et 
al [19].  
 
Patriciu and Furtuna [20] presented a number of steps and 
guidelines that should be followed when designing a 
cybersecurity exercise. One another approach of such live-
attack exercises presented by White [21], lessons learned from 
illustrative examples of such exercises, as well as suggestions 
to help organizations conduct their own exercise. Other 
literature examined how to offer cyber defense competitions in 
the private sector, using a service provider model [22].  
 
Existing literature has examined the potential benefits of 
cyber defense exercises. One another benefit of cyber defense 
exercise that can be instrumented to generate scientifically 
valuable modern labeled datasets for future security research 
[23, 24] and help uncover gaps in IT Security policies, plans 
and procedures [25]. It was claimed that [26] cyber exercises 
can be developed with a focus on measuring performance 
against specific standards. In cyber defense exercises, to 
measure team effectiveness and gain knowledge how to do 
that, the role of behavioral assessment techniques was 
investigated as a complement to task-based performance 
measurement [27]. 
 
In the literature, The RINSE simulator that is the real-time 
immersive network simulation environment for network 
security exercises was presented as a realistic rendering of 
network behavior [28]. In addition to that to execute real-time 
security exercises on a realistic inter-domain routing 
experiment platform was presented in the past [29]. A 
developed method for Job Performance Modeling (JPM) which 
uses vignettes for improving cybersecurity talent management 
through cyber defense competition design was described by 
Tobey [30]. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Since the cyberspace was recognized as the fifth battlefield 
after land, sea, air, and space, it has begun to be of critical 
importance, especially in terms of national security. These 
attacks have become more popular in recent times, as cyber-
attacks can be performed anonymously, declassified, and 
relatively inexpensive to perform in other areas. Therefore, 
countries have begun to use and develop cyberweapons at a 
sophisticated level of technology and sophisticated technology. 
 
In order to safeguard the digital security of the public and 
the society, which is becoming an integral part of the national 
security, against cyber-attacks, states accept the idea that it is 
necessary to establish and disseminate authorities such as cyber 
defence commands, national cyber incident response teams, 
computer emergency readiness teams, and other information 
security centers. They also have begun to develop national 
cybersecurity strategies and put into practice. 
 
In terms of cyber defense, cyber exercises have been 
playing a very important role in testing the technical cyber 
capacity of nations or organizations, cyber training, and cyber 
awareness raising that’s why they have started to become 
widespread all over the world. Among the main objectives of 
the cyber defense exercises, they can increase [31, 32, 33, 34]; 
 
 The ability to test and develop common and 
coordinated technical and strategic mobility against 
the cyberattacks that may occur on a national basis. 
 The Ability to test and develop common and 
coordinated technical and strategic mobility against 
cyber attacks, which may occur on an international 
basis. 
 Ability to test and develop continuity and improving 
continuity processes with cybersecurity capabilities. 
 Strengthening cooperation and coordination between 
public and private sectors in the cyberspace. 
 Gathering empirical data related to cybersecurity 
research. 
 The maturity level of legal and regulatory compliance. 
 
In the following sections, the worldwide cyber defense 
exercises, and processes, types, and contributions of these 
exercises was examined with examples. 
 
From the planning stage through to the implementation, 
execution and finally to the evaluation stage, cyber defense 
exercises can provide important contributions to both the 
exercise planners and their participants. These processes of 
exercises also can give an idea to a developer who develops 
mechanisms for the cyber defense. 
III. CYBER DEFENCE EXERCISES AROUND THE WORLD 
Europe is at the forefront of the biggest players in the field 
of cyber defense exercises. In the past, 42 percent of the global 
cyber defense exercises have been carried out in Europe, as can 
be seen in Figure 1 [5]. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Cyber Defence Exercises (Worldwide 
Distribution)  
 
 
Another actor, at least as important as Europe, in the field, 
is North America, especially the United States. North America 
is followed by Asia, mostly Japan, Malaysia, India, and 
Singapore. Australia comes right after Asia. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Cyber Defence Exercises (Asia Distribution) 
 
Cyber defense exercises that were executed in Asia is as 
shown in Figure 2 [35]. It is noteworthy that Malaysia has 
moved up to second place just right after Japan, especially with 
investments that Malaysia has made in recent years to this 
field. Even though Japan’s and Malaysia’s number are close to 
each other, it is clear that Japan has much more experience in 
cyber defense exercises than in Malaysia.  
 
Locked Shields, Cyber Coalition, Cyber Europe can be 
given as examples of a few cyber defense exercises carried out 
on an international scale. 
 
Locked Shields: Locked Shields is organized annually by 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(NATO CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. It’s accepted by the 
authorities that Locked Shields is the world's largest, most 
complex and technologically advanced cyber defense exercise. 
More than 900 cybersecurity experts from around the world 
have been involved in the 2017 Locked Shields exercise and 
the national teams of 20 countries have contributed. More than 
2,500 attacks on the national teams (blue teams) were carried 
out by the red team in the exercise where more than 3,000 
virtual systems were involved. Locked Shields exercises follow 
a successful route to adopting information technologies. As an 
example, the smart grid systems, air-to-air fueling systems, and 
drone control systems were added to exercise environment in 
2017 [36].  
 
Cyber Coalition: Cyber Coalition is organized annually by 
NATO. It’s a three-day event and participation are from NATO 
members and alliance countries. In December 2016, more than 
700 cyber defense and legal experts, government officials, 
officers, academics and industry representatives were involved 
in this exercise. In the exercise, there was also cyber defense 
personnel from the European Union and representatives of 
non-NATO countries such as Algeria, Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Japan and Sweden [37]. 
 
Cyber Europe: It is organized by ENISA (European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security), every two 
years for members of the European Union. Unlike military-
based exercises such as Locked Shields and Cyber Coalition, It 
is organized by a civilian authority. The exercise, which took 
place in 2016, was included of the 28 European Union member 
states and 2 member countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), although those countries are not a 
member of EU [38]. 
 
IV. CYBER DEFENCE EXERCISES TAXONOMY 
Cyber defense exercises can be carried out in various 
forms. According to the data set to be obtained, these types of 
exercises differ. However, the differences are based on 
parameters from ISO 22398, an international standard. It is 
possible to categorize cyber defense exercise into the following 
four groups for their objectives [39]: 
 
i. Improvement and test of national/international cyber 
incident response cooperation. 
ii. Evaluation/Competition of the cybersecurity skills, 
incident preparedness of individuals, organizations, 
and systems. 
iii. Assessing information, readiness, capability, 
endurance and/or technical capacity. 
iv. Training participants in real-world scenarios that 
provide the opportunity to gain knowledge, insight, 
experience by developing their skills and resilience 
before an incident. 
 
Figure 3 – CDX by Type [40] 
 
Despite all the different types of exercises that can be 
created such as capture the flag, discussion-based game, 
simulation, workshop, drills, seminar, cyber defense exercises 
can basically be divided into three categories [41]; 
 
1. Table Top Exercises: All scenarios / sub-scenarios, 
injections, and red team attacks are written and 
prepared before the exercise. In most cases, exercise 
planners and actors sit on a table and perform 
exercises, so such exercises are called table-top 
exercises. Table-top exercises should have a fairly 
limited number of training units and very well defined 
objectives [42]. The application process is relatively 
easy as it can be planned faster and in a shorter time 
than other types of exercises. 
2. (Hybrid) Exercises: Exercise scenario / sub-scenarios 
and injections are pre-written, but the red team 
performs and attacks live during the exercise. 
Exercise planners perform exercises with a red team 
that applies real events according to pre-determined 
targets [43]. 
3. Full Live Exercises: In such exercises, while the main 
scenario and some sub-scenarios have already been 
prepared, there are instant scenarios and injections 
which are developed by the white teams (usually) 
according to the blue team's progress and strategies. 
The red team also develops new attack strategies 
based on the defensive capacity and status of the blue 
team. When compared with cyber defense exercises 
types, the planning process for full live exercises is 
much longer and more realistic [44]. 
 
V. CYBER DEFENCE EXERCISES LIFE-CYCLE 
In general, cyber defense exercises life-cycle has four 
major parts as follow [45]; 
 
Identifying: Includes topics such as recognizing and creating 
participants profile, determining the type and size of the 
exercise, evaluating current scenario options. 
Planning: Includes topics such as Informing and training the 
people and teams involved in the exercise, setting up the media 
policy, inviting observers and media members, providing 
financial resources, setting the schedule and location of the 
exercise, distributing roles and creating a realistic scenario, 
preparing the exercise materials. 
 
Conducting: Includes topics such as Implementation of the 
exercise in the most appropriate frame and rules, 
implementation of the scenarios and injections according to the 
determined sequence, resolution of the problems and faults that 
can occur during the exercise in the shortest and quickest 
manner, observation of participants and taking notes of 
decisions and activities of participants, and the management of 
the questionnaire and surveys for participants in order to 
support them. 
 
Evaluating: Includes the creation of a group evaluating the 
exercises’ results, the collection and evaluation of 
questionnaires and surveys answered by the participants, the 
collection of necessary information from the participants in the 
exercise, the preparation of documents to be submitted to the 
media, and the preparation of reports to be shared with the 
evaluators. 
 
 
Figure 4 - CDX Life Cycle [43] 
 
VI. PLANNING 
A. Determination of Objectives 
A cyber exercise can be organized as an individual acting 
on an isolated network or as a broader training application on 
an operational network. Planning processes are similar. The 
exercise planning process begins with the determination of the 
purpose of the exercise and its desired outcome. Without 
explicit targets, planners cannot design a meaningful exercise. 
These goals allow participants to clearly configure scenarios in 
practice to determine whether they have the necessary skills in 
a cyber-environment against cyber threats. Different 
organizations have different guiding principles, tools, tactics, 
and procedures that make it important to create a starting point 
for each exercise. 
 
 The determination of the effectiveness of the 
cyber training provided to participants before the 
exercise started, 
 Evaluation of the effectiveness of exercise 
incident reports and preparation of analysis guides 
to address the deficiencies identified through the 
exercise, 
 Evaluation of the ability of participants’ necessary 
response against harmful activities and assess, 
 Identifying the operational impacts of cyber-
attacks and assessing the ability to implement 
recovery and recovery procedures required for 
these attacks, 
 Determining the success of scenario planning and 
implementation, 
 The elimination and correction of weaknesses in 
cybersecurity systems, 
 Removal and correction of weaknesses in policies 
and procedures related to cyberspace, 
 To maintain an information system and to 
determine what equipment or capabilities are 
required to carry out the necessary activities in a 
cyber-environment where harmful attacks are 
carried out, 
 Determining whether the injections meet the 
objectives of the exercise, 
 Increasing cyber awareness, readiness and 
coordination against cyber-attacks, 
 Development of emergency preparedness plans for 
minimum damage, prevention by taking necessary 
precautions and protecting the information 
systems against cyber-attacks, 
 
are common targets set for all cyber defense exercises in 
general. 
 
B. Planning Process 
 
 
Figure 5 - Planning Process [40] 
 
1) Initial Planning Meeting/Conference;  
Covers topics such as; 
 Determination of requirements and conditions, 
 Determination of scenario variables and draft scenario 
proposals, 
 Collection of required information and distribution of 
tasks between execution planners, 
It takes place approximately 6, 7 months before the exercises. 
 
II) Main Planning Meeting/Conference;  
Covers topics such as; 
 Reconciliation of logistical and organizational 
problems such as personnel, scenario and time 
schedule development and administrative 
requirements, 
 Examining, evaluating and finalizing all the draft 
documents to be used in the exercise, 
 Examination and development of the injections prior 
to the final planning stage, 
 Reviewing of the duties, conditions, and standards 
determined for the purpose of the exercise, 
It takes place approximately 3, 4 months before the exercise. 
 
III) Final Planning Meeting/Conference;  
The final planning conference is the final meeting to 
oversee the implementation processes and procedures. After 
this meeting, no major changes should be made to the design or 
coverage of the exercise or its supporting documentation. It 
takes place approximately 3, 4 weeks before the exercise. 
 
IV) Test-Run; 
Test-Run is the final preparation phase for testing and 
evaluating the technical infrastructure of the cyber defense 
exercises. In test-run, it is aimed to establish all the sub-
structures to be used for the exercise in the selected place for 
the exercise and to test these sub-structures as if the exercise 
process is working normally and to observe the possible 
problems before the exercise. Participation from all teams 
except the blue teams takes place in test-run. Thus, all teams 
will have the chance to review their final situation and practice 
process before the exercise. Test-run takes place approximately 
one week before the exercise. 
 
VII. EXECUTION 
A. Teams 
I) Blue Team (Defensive); 
Blue team is responsible for ensuring and defending the 
security of a company's or organization’s information systems 
against virtual attackers (red team) in a virtual environment 
created within the scope of practice. In international cyber 
defense exercises, blue teams represent the national teams of 
each participating country. Against the simulated attacks, blue 
team should defend its network; 
 over a given period of time, 
 a defense based and operational context, 
 following the exercise’s rules. 
 
Blue team also should identify and prevent any data 
leakage on their system The team also responsible for the 
protection of privacy, integrity, and usability of their network. 
 
Since the cyber defense has been a part of national and 
international law and politics, media and national security 
strategies in recent times, the cyber defense exercises have also 
begun to be designed in this context. Only the technical 
defense by the blue team has begun to be seen as insufficient 
within the scope of cyber defenses. For this reason, legal, 
policy, strategy, and media scenarios have begun to be 
included in addition to technical scenarios, especially for 
international cyber defense exercises, so the responsibilities of 
the blue team have been increased. 
 
The responsibilities of the Blue Team must always be 
observed within the framework of the rules of engagement [31, 
32, 33, 34], the applicable laws and regulations, and any illegal 
action was taken by the team members is deemed 
unacceptable. Therefore, it is very important that all the actions 
and decisions taken by the blue team, even in the simulation 
environment, be performed without ignoring the existing laws 
and regulations. 
 
Another clear rule in the rules of engagement is that the 
blue team cannot attack the exercise infrastructure, other blue 
teams, the red team and the virtual systems. 
 
Blue team members must provide the right information, 
which will not harm their operational safety when requested. 
 
Blue teams are able to communicate the green team that is 
responsible for exercises infrastructure, through the web page 
designed for them by submitting notifications and requests 
related to the technical problems about the exercise 
environment. The green team is responsible for resolving these 
technical problems within reasonable time.  
 
It is important that all reports created by the team are made 
through the command chain within the team. Blue teams are 
allowed to use their own tools and software products, but all 
responsibility for the licensed copy of these products belongs 
to this team. 
 
Within the white team, there is a group of people called 
‘blonde user’ who are a response to occupy blue teams’ users’ 
services and systems. These users represent unconscious users 
and they may open harmful emails and files by clicking 
malicious links unconscıously. It is against the rules for the 
blue teams to deny these users' services and systems used by 
these users. It is also expected that the blue teams will be able 
to resolve the requests submitted by these users regarding 
technical problems related to the systems they are using, within 
a limited time. 
 
In order to transfer preliminary information about the 
systems to be used with the exercise environment, blue teams 
are informed through webinars before the exercises. 
 
II) Red Team (Offensive); 
The aim of the red team is to achieve cyber-attacks equally 
to all the blue teams participating in the exercise. For this 
purpose, the red team follows a predefined scenario and has the 
permission to use security vulnerabilities that are already 
created in the blue team's systems. Successful attacks by the 
red team lead to a negative score for the blue teams. The red 
team and the white team must work closely together. The red 
team must always follow the instructions given by the white 
team. It is strictly forbidden for the red team to attack the 
services and infrastructure used by the green team. It is 
imperative that all attacks carried out by the Red Team remain 
within the exercise environment. This includes social 
engineering. 
 
III) Green Team; 
Green team is responsible for preparing and maintaining 
exercise systems and infrastructure. These infrastructures 
include systems that design, set up, and manage administrative 
computer nodes, virtualization platforms, storage, and core 
networking, as well as systems that blue teams must defend 
during the exercise. In order to ensure that these systems are 
functioning properly during the exercise, it is expected from 
the green team that they will be able to solve the technical 
problems submitted by the blue teams within a reasonable 
period of time. 
 
IV) Yellow Team; 
The role of the yellow team is to provide situational 
awareness during the exercise first for the white team and then 
for all participants in the exercise. The main sources of 
information for the yellow team are the interim reports 
provided by the blue teams, the reports of the attack campaigns 
from the red team members, and the reports provided by the 
system. The yellow team provides regular updates to white 
team leaders and blue teams. 
 
V) White Team; 
The white team is responsible for organizing the exercise 
and checking it during the execution. The white team 
determines the exercise objectives, the scenario, the high-level 
objectives for the red team, legal injections, rules, media 
preparations and communication plans. During the execution, 
the white team provides control of the exercise by determining 
when to start different stages, controlling the execution of the 
red team's campaign, and scoring issues. Management, blonde 
users, injections, scoring and media simulation are among the 
responsibilities of the white team. 
 
B. Scenario 
The desired outcomes of the exercise vary from one 
exercise to another, but these outputs always revolve around 
presenting realistic scenarios to demonstrate the cyber-
threatening methods of participation and to evaluate the 
success of the exercise programs. Exercise outcomes should 
aim to raise awareness of various cyber threats and to give an 
idea to make a plan to prevent them. An example scenario of 
an international cyber defense exercise in the past years as 
follows; Country X is an island republic located in the western 
part of Africa and is a member of an international organization. 
There is a coalition force of this organization in the country. 
While the size of the island is comparable to that of Ireland, the 
climate and landscape are closer to Morocco. The Republic of 
X is a poor country, and especially sanitation, communication, 
medical services and education are quite inadequate. For 
example, the country has an insecure internet connection with 
the rest of the world, and the bandwidth of the connection is 
low. There are no law enforcement agencies or CERT to 
protect the country’s information systems. This forces most 
international actors in the county to install and use expensive 
satellite communications or locally operated systems. 
 
The Republic of X is in diplomatic conflicts with the 
Country of Y (a neighbor), which has been criticized by the 
international community for having a vigilant anti-democratic 
government. For a long time, the Republic of X is exposed to 
the cyber-attack, which is predicted to originate from the 
Country of Y. Immediately following the last diplomatic crisis 
between the Republic of X and the Country of Y, cyber-attacks 
started to take place at the Air Force base of the Republic of X 
and a number of confidential information and documents were 
stolen. As part of the international coalition, the mission of the 
blue team is to take necessary precautions at the Air Force 
base, analyzing IT devices, preventing ongoing and possible 
future attacks, and reporting to the HQ.  
 
The Blue Team should try to fulfill the duties assigned to it 
in an unfamiliar system. They need to take in consideration the 
rules, media and strategy-based sub-scenarios and injections 
that will be included later throughout the exercise. 
 
C. Scoring 
Scoring is one of the most troubling issues for cyber 
defense exercises. Even if the scoring systems that are made 
are tried to be standardized, it is highly probable that objections 
always arise from the blue teams because scoring is usually 
made based on the initiative of the white team. For this reason, 
many cyber defense exercises, especially the ones that are 
organized at the international level, opposed the scoring system 
by arguing that scoring isn’t the main purpose of the cyber 
defense exercises. Creating competition environment to build a 
better cyber defense is the main reason for score supporters. 
One of the examples of exercises that do not use the scoring 
system is Cyber Europe organized by ENISA. However, the 
use of the scoring system in such exercises was seen as a 
motivation tool for participants, and the positive competition 
between participants was a greater impetus for achieving more 
successful outcomes. Locked Shields, which was organized by 
NATO CCD COE, has been using scoring systems at the 
exercise. 
 
D. Monitoring 
Monitoring and logging is the basis for the scoring system 
and it helps identifying and responding to incidents during the 
exercise at an early stage. Cyber defence exercises are 
performed in a limited time and too many attacks and network 
activity occurs via exercise team members in this period that 
makes difficult for organizators to monitor corporate data being 
created across multiple networks and nodes. Therefore, 
monitoring provides a good understanding and in-depth 
analysis of fields in event logs and alerts created via Syslog, 
Nagios, DPI, NetFlow, etc. It is believed that controlling and 
scoring is one of the primary and critical asset in CDX that 
helps understanding real-time situation and performance of 
teams throughout the exercise and provides fine-grained 
control over network links and hosts. 
E. Media Activity Simulator 
The media simulator allows the actors to view and interact 
with the media and social media as if they were in real life. All 
players have their own passwords for social media use. Live to 
broadcast on all media and social platforms such as Twitter, 
Facebook, TV, radio, online news and newspapers are 
available through the simulator. With this simulation, web 
pages for the institutions and organizations of the host country 
are also available based on the scenario. While blue teams are 
busy taking the necessary precautions against attacks from red 
teams, they have to take the necessary steps in the media 
dimension as well like in real life. 
 
F. Injections 
Injections can be divided into 4 categories as; scenario 
injections, media games, legal games, and forensics. 
1. scenario injections; scenario injections prepared by 
the white team that includes taking necessary precautions 
against cyber threat and vulnerabilities, following the news, 
evaluating intelligence, gathering information about cyber-
attacks and preparing reports. 
2. Media scenario; As mentioned before, the purpose of 
the media simulation is to bring the media environment to 
exercise environment so to challenge the blue teams even 
further. The stories in the news include information about 
events that occurred on ongoing cyber events, negative 
comments for the current cyber-attacks as well as fabricated 
news about them. 
3. Legal games; The ability of the blue team to answer 
questions from the chain of command depends on having deep 
legal knowledge. To deal with complicated legal issues, to 
refute false statements and interpretations, and to communicate 
with the media in order to make the legal explanations related 
to the cyber-attacks intriguing to the general public 
understandable to those who are not experts and to respond in 
legal context to the news and analyzes that the media has 
published, are among the requirements of the game. 
4. Forensic; Forensic aims to answer the questions 
related to current cyber-attacks such as who did it? what 
happened, when happened, how happened and why happened? 
 
VIII. EXECUTION 
One of the most important outputs of the cyber defense 
exercises is the After Action Report. At this report, it is 
mentioned the detailed performance of each blue team after the 
exercise. Addition to that the scenario and sub-scenarios, 
injections, exercise purposes, participants, scoring, technical 
infrastructure, red team attacks (client-side, web, network), 
defences made by the blue team, defects in these defences, 
general mistakes made, observations from all teams and sub-
teams, recommendations and evaluations are also covered.  
 
In addition, another private report is shared with each blue 
team separately about their specific performance team that 
includes analysis, evaluation, weaknesses and weak points, 
recommendations and recommendations during the practice. 
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The importance of defense exercises is increasing day by 
day. It would be possible for countries to be involved in the 
global cyber defence exercises in the international arena, 
spreading the development and implementation of their own 
cyber defence exercise platforms on a national basis, and 
allocating higher budget figures to the planning and 
development of these exercises could contribute to achieving 
beneficial outcomes in the future to create stronger cyber 
defence systems. The emphasis on these exercises on the 
national and international scene will provide benefits in terms 
of uncovering the vulnerabilities in the area of the cyberspace, 
as well as the revitalization of the cyber defense awareness, 
and also the integrated technologies that can be followed in 
exercises related to the cyber defense. 
 
As mentioned earlier for future studies, a technical tool will 
be developed on the scoring system, which is a problematic 
issue for cyber defense exercises, and on the standardization of 
this system and the development of a fairer system. As 
mentioned, the integration of new technologies such as power 
grid systems and drone control systems into cyber defense 
exercises is a critical issue. With the integration of these special 
systems into the exercises, the existing problems and the 
methods to be followed are another work to be done in the 
future. 
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